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AM I UNDER ARREST? WHY THE U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES NEED A STRICT DEFINITION OF WHAT 
CONSTITUTES AN INTERVENING ARREST 
Rebekah R. Runyon 
Abstract 
Congress provided for the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
to promote fairness and produce proportional and uniform sentences. The 
Guidelines provide judges with a guideline range for sentencing based on 
a defendant’s criminal history score and the offense level of the 
defendant’s criminal conduct. A defendant’s prior “intervening arrests” 
are considered in computing her criminal history score. But the current 
version of the Guidelines does not clearly define what constitutes an 
intervening arrest for the purposes of calculating an offender’s score. 
Consequently, a split has developed between circuit courts as to whether 
a criminal traffic citation constitutes an intervening arrest when 
determining a defendant’s criminal history score. This Note analyzes the 
different definitions of an intervening arrest within the circuit courts. It 
then outlines reasons why the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition of an intervening arrest should prevail. Finally, this 
Note proposes that the U.S. Sentencing Commission should revise the 
Guidelines to provide a clearer explanation of the term intervening arrest 
in order to resolve disagreement among the circuit courts and achieve 
greater fairness in sentencing. 
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INTRODUCTION  
An arrest can have a myriad of future effects on a defendant. Among 
the most problematic for a defendant is the effect of prior “intervening 
arrests” on his criminal sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(Guidelines). Currently, the Guidelines do not clearly define the term 
intervening arrest for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s criminal 
history score. The absence of a firm definition is particularly apparent 
when it comes to calculating a criminal history score for a defendant with 
prior criminal traffic citations. Does a traffic citation for driving with a 
suspended license qualify as an intervening arrest? Under the current state 
of the law, the answer depends on where the citation is issued. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit treats the issuance 
of a criminal traffic citation as an intervening arrest under the Guidelines. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, does not. 
Defining intervening arrest to include criminal traffic citations can lead 
to inflated criminal history scores, particularly for victims of racial 
profiling, pushing some defendants into a higher criminal history 
category. This can result in criminals with unequal culpability receiving 
the same punishment. Thus, it is essential to define the term intervening 
arrest to best reflect the purposes behind the Guidelines and in a way that 
allows judges the flexibility to take into account other important policy 
considerations.   
This Note addresses whether criminal traffic citations should 
constitute intervening arrests for purposes of calculating a defendant’s 
criminal history score under the Guidelines. Part I provides a 
comprehensive history of the Guidelines and offers an explanation of how 
to calculate a defendant’s guideline range. This explanation includes a 
full discussion of section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines, which depicts 
how criminal history scores are calculated. Part I then describes the 
consequences of having multiple, separate arrests and provides an 
illustration of these computations. Part II discusses the case law that has 
created the current circuit split. It begins with an examination of the 
2
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Seventh Circuit’s holding in United States v. Morgan1 that, for purposes 
of calculating a defendant’s criminal history score, traffic citations 
constitute intervening arrests.2 The Part then discusses the contrary Ninth 
Circuit holding in United States v. Leal-Felix3 that traffic citations do not 
constitute intervening arrests under the Guidelines.4 Part II concludes 
with a discussion of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida’s decision in United States v. Johnson5 agreeing with the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding and noting that citations in general should be included 
in the definition of an intervening arrest.6 Part III provides policy-based 
arguments for why the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of intervening arrest 
should prevail over that of the Seventh Circuit. Finally, Part IV proposes 
revising the Guidelines to provide a clearer explanation of the term 
intervening arrest in order to resolve the current split and to ensure that 
an offender’s criminal history calculation reflects the purposes of the 
Guidelines. Adopting this revision will result in a fairer sentencing 
system by ensuring that offenders of similar culpability are punished with 
equal severity.  
I.  THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
This Part begins by providing a history of the Guidelines, which 
includes an explanation of how and more importantly why Congress 
chose to implement a sentencing system. An analysis of the purposes 
behind the Guidelines demonstrates that the ambiguity of what 
constitutes an intervening arrest contradicts the very fairness and 
uniformity the Guidelines were intended to create. Additionally, this Part 
provides an explanation of how the Guidelines are used to calculate a 
defendant’s sentencing range. An illustration is used to demonstrate the 
effect an intervening arrest can have on the calculation of a defendant’s 
sentence thereby showing the importance of clearly defining whether 
traffic citations should be considered intervening arrests. 
A.  History of the Guidelines 
Prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, federal judges had unfettered 
discretion in determining an offender’s sentence.7 Because most federal 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 354 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 2. Id. at 623–24. 
 3. 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
 4. Id. at 1044. 
 5. 876 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in part and dismissed in part, 515 F. 
App’x 844 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  
 6. Id. at 1274–75. 
 7. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993). 
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criminal statutes provide only a maximum term of years for a given 
violation, judges had complete discretion to impose sentences for any 
number of months up to the statutory maximum.8 This practice resulted 
in wide variations in sentences among offenders who committed the same 
violations. In an attempt to rectify this indeterminate sentencing, 
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which provided for the 
creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission).9  
The Commission is an independent agency of the judicial branch that 
Congress created to develop sentencing guidelines for the federal 
courts.10 The Commission designed the Guidelines, which went into 
effect on November 1, 1987, to achieve three primary objectives: (1) to 
create a fair sentencing system that provided offenders certainty and 
honesty in sentencing; (2) to narrow the disparity in sentencing among 
similar offenders convicted of similar crimes; and (3) to establish a 
sentencing system that calculated a defendant’s sentence in proportion to 
the severity of the individual’s criminal conduct.11  
Although the Commission originally styled the Guidelines as 
mandatory,12 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Booker13 held 
that the mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by jury.14 The Court excised the statutory provision that made the 
Guidelines mandatory, rendering them advisory only and thereby 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); id. § 217(a) (creating the 
Commission); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Expertise and Opinion Assignment on the Courts of 
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1599, 1629 (2014); Steven Nauman, Note, 
Brown v. Plata: Renewing the Call to End Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 65 FLA. L. REV. 855, 
863 (2013) (“In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act as part of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984, creating the United States Sentencing Commission.”); An Overview 
of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2015); The Beginning of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/09-08-
01/The_Beginning_of_the_U_S_Sentencing_Guidelines.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).  
 10. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2014); The Beginning of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 9; An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, 
supra note 9, at 1; see also Jacy Owens, A Progressive Response: Judicial Delegation of Authority 
to Federal Probation Officers, 64 FLA. L. REV. 817, 823 (2012) (discussing the policy 
undergirding the Sentencing Reform Act).  
 11. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3; An Overview of the United States 
Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
 12. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: 
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2013).  
 13. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 14. Id. at 245. 
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permitting courts to calculate sentences in light of other concerns as 
well.15 Booker, however, did direct the federal courts to consult the 
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.16 Subsequently, 
in Rita v. United States,17 the Court held that a court of appeals may apply 
a presumption of reasonableness to district court sentences within the 
guideline range.18 Following Booker and Rita, the Court has continued to 
emphasize the importance of the Guidelines in recent sentencing-related 
cases.19  
B.  Guideline Range 
The Guidelines provide federal judges with a suggested range of 
months for sentencing defendants—the guideline range.20 Chapter Five, 
Part A of the Guidelines includes the Sentencing Table for calculating a 
defendant’s guideline range based on both the defendant’s offense level 
and the defendant’s criminal history score.21 This Section will explain 
how both of those scores are calculated to determine a defendant’s 
guideline range.  
1.  Determining the Offense Level and Criminal History Score 
To properly calculate a defendant’s guideline range, the judge must 
first determine the defendant’s offense level and criminal history score.22 
The Guidelines assign most federal crimes an offense level between one 
and forty-three based on the severity of the criminal conduct and the 
specific characteristics of the offense.23 Thus, the judge obtains a 
defendant’s offense level directly from the values provided in the 
Guidelines. Determining an individual’s criminal history score, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Id. at 245–46. 
 16. Id. at 264.  
 17. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).  
 18. Id. at 347; see An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, 
at 2. 
 19. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 2; see, e.g., 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (holding that although the Guidelines are 
advisory, district judges must “include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting 
consideration”); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (providing that the Guidelines 
“should be the starting point and initial benchmark” as a matter of administration and nationwide 
consistency).  
 20. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 2.  
 21. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2014). A copy of the 
Sentencing Table is appended to this Note.  
 22. See id.; see also Kathryn A. Kimball, Note, Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in 
Sentencing Child Pornography Offenders, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1515, 1521 (2011).  
 23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A; An Overview of the United 
States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 2. 
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is less straightforward. Sections 4A1.1 and 4A1.2 of the Guidelines 
provide the instructions for computing a defendant’s criminal history 
score.24 
Section 4A1.1 of the Guidelines breaks down the number of points a 
defendant receives for any prior sentences.25 For example, according to 
the Guidelines, three points are added to a defendant’s criminal history 
score “for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and 
one month.”26 Therefore, if a defendant served two years in prison for a 
prior offense, then the defendant would have a criminal history score of 
three. Section 4A1.2 of the Guidelines provides further instructions for 
computing a defendant’s criminal history score when the defendant has 
multiple prior sentences. According to section 4A1.2(a)(2), if the 
defendant has multiple prior sentences, it is necessary to determine 
whether to count the sentences separately or as a single sentence.27 
Section 4A1.2(a)(2) explains that “[p]rior sentences always are counted 
separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated 
by an intervening arrest.”28 This occurs when “the defendant is arrested 
for the first offense prior to committing the second offense.”29 “If there is 
no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) 
the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging 
instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day.” 30 Any 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2. 
 25. The breakdown pursuant to section 4A1.1 is as follows: 
The total points from subsections (a) through (e) determine the criminal history 
category in the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A. 
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and 
one month. 
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days 
not counted in (a). 
(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 
4 points for this subsection. 
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any 
criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, 
imprisonment, work release, or escape status. 
(e) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of 
violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such 
sentence was counted as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this 
subsection.  
Id. § 4A1.1.  
 26. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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prior sentences covered by (A) or (B) are counted as a single sentence.31 
Based on these point determinations, the defendant is given a criminal 
history score and assigned to one of six criminal history categories.32  
2.  Calculating the Guideline Range 
After determining a defendant’s offense level and criminal history 
score, a judge uses these numbers to find the defendant’s guideline range 
on the Sentencing Table provided in the Guidelines.33 The point at which 
these two values intersect on the Sentencing Table determines the 
guideline range.34 The Sentencing Table states guideline ranges in 
months of imprisonment, and the top of each range exceeds the bottom 
of the range by either six months or twenty-five percent, whichever is 
greater.35 Federal judges must consult the Guidelines when imposing 
sentences, but judges have flexibility for sentencing offenders within the 
upper and lower boundaries of the guideline range.36 Unless a judge 
determines that the Commission did not consider a factor that would 
result in a different sentence—one beyond the guideline range 
boundaries—the Commission advises judges to impose a sentence term 
within the guideline range.37 
3.  An Illustration 
The following example illustrates the calculation of a defendant’s 
guideline range: Suppose police arrest a defendant for Crime C. Prior to 
this arrest, the defendant served two sentences. Eight years ago, he was 
arrested for Crime A and then sentenced to thirty-six months in prison.38 
Shortly after his release, police arrested the defendant for Crime B,39 and 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A; An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra 
note 9, at 2. 
 33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (setting forth the Sentencing 
Table); An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 3. A copy of 
the Sentencing Table is appended to this Note. 
 34. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A; An Overview of the United 
States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 3. 
 35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A; An Overview of the United 
States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 3. 
 36. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 3. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Assume Crime A has a base offense level of 20. A defendant with no prior sentences is 
assigned to criminal history category I. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. According to the Sentencing Table, 
a defendant assigned to criminal history category I who committed a crime with an offense level 
of twenty is subject to a guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one months. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
The federal court has the discretion to choose a sentence within that range. Id. at ch. 5, intro. cmt.  
 39. Assume Crime B also has an offense level of 20.  
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he spent forty-two months in prison for that offense.40 Therefore, the 
defendant now has a criminal history score of six—three points for his 
prior sentence for Crime A and three points for his prior sentence for 
Crime B—because the length of each prior sentence exceeded one year 
and one month.41 The defendant’s arrest for Crime A was an intervening 
arrest because he was arrested for the offense prior to being arrested for 
Crime B. Thus, a judge would count the two offenses separately42 and, 
based on the Sentencing Table, assign the defendant to criminal history 
category III.43 The defendant’s most recent arrest was for Crime C, which 
has a base offense level of fifteen. According to the Sentencing Table, a 
defendant who is assigned to criminal history category III and who 
committed a crime with an offense level of fifteen is subject to a guideline 
range of twenty-four to thirty months.44 
Would the defendant’s criminal history score be different if his only 
prior convictions were criminal traffic citations? Suppose that prior to his 
arrest for Crime C, police issued the defendant separate traffic citations 
for two different instances of driving with a suspended license. And 
assume police never took the defendant into custody. Would a judge 
consider the defendant’s traffic citations intervening arrests? The Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits answer this question differently, in part because the 
Commission’s failure to define the term intervening arrest in the 
Guidelines allows disagreement over the term’s meaning. Part II of this 
Note discusses these circuits’ interpretations of the term intervening 
arrest in reference to criminal traffic citations.  
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Courts have struggled to define the term intervening arrest for 
purposes of calculating a defendant’s criminal history score under section 
4A1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines. Courts differ on whether motor vehicle 
stops constitute intervening arrests when defendants are detained for only 
a short period of time while being issued a traffic citation. This Part 
analyzes three cases that have interpreted the term intervening arrest and 
provides a full discussion of each court’s holding. The relevant case law 
                                                                                                                     
 40. For purposes of this illustration, the defendant was not on probation when he committed 
Crime B. Therefore, the defendant has a criminal history score of three for his prior sentence of 
thirty-six months. Id. § 4A1.1. The defendant is assigned to criminal history category II. See id. 
at ch. 5, pt. A. According to the Sentencing Table, a defendant  assigned to criminal history 
category II who committed a crime with an offense level of twenty is subject to a guideline range 
of thirty-seven to forty-six months. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. The federal court has the discretion to 
choose a sentence within that range. Id. at ch. 5, intro. cmt.  
 41. See id. § 4A1.1. 
 42. See id. § 4A1.2. 
 43. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 44. See id.  
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begins in 2003 with United States v. Morgan, in which the Seventh 
Circuit held that traffic citations were intervening arrests for purposes of 
calculating a defendant’s criminal history score.45 In 2011, a Ninth 
Circuit ruling created the current split. In United States v. Leal-Felix, the 
Ninth Circuit held that traffic citations did not constitute intervening 
arrests.46 The most recent ruling addressing this issue is the 2012 case 
United States v. Johnson.47 In Johnson, the Middle District of Florida 
sided with the Seventh Circuit in ruling that citations constitute 
intervening arrests for purposes of calculating a defendant’s criminal 
history score, but the analysis in Johnson focused heavily on citations for 
drug possession, not traffic violations.48   
A.  The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Morgan 
A jury convicted Zan Morgan of distributing crack cocaine.49 At 
Morgan’s sentencing hearing, the district court included two prior 
convictions for driving with a revoked driver’s license in its calculation 
of his criminal history score.50 The district court held that Morgan’s two 
prior convictions were separated by an intervening arrest—Morgan’s 
initial citation on May 5, 1999 and Morgan’s second citation fifteen days 
later.51 Including these prior convictions increased Morgan’s criminal 
history score and therefore his guideline range.52 The judge sentenced 
Morgan to a total of 154 months imprisonment.53  
Morgan appealed to the Seventh Circuit on the grounds that the 
district court miscalculated his criminal history score because his prior 
offenses were “related” and should therefore have been counted only 
                                                                                                                     
 45. 354 F.3d 621, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 46. 665 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 47. 876 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in part and dismissed in part, 515 F. 
App’x 844 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  
 48. See id. at 1274–75.  
 49. Morgan, 354 F.3d at 622.  
 50. Id. at 623. 
 51. Id. In 2003, when Morgan was sentenced, section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines read: 
“Prior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences imposed 
in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of § 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c).” See 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). For the purposes 
of calculating criminal history, “unrelated” was defined as those offenses separated by an 
intervening arrest. Morgan, 354 F.3d at 623 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
4A1.2, application note 3 (2003)). In 2007, this subdivision was replaced with the current 
provision. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. c at 230–31 (2008) (explaining the 
2007 amendment to the provision). 
 52. Morgan, 354 F.3d at 623. 
 53. Id. at 622.  
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once.54 Morgan argued that he was never arrested on May 5.55 According 
to Morgan, he was only stopped and issued a citation to appear in court.56 
Morgan insisted that, pursuant to Application Note 3 to section 4A1.2,  
an intervening arrest requires that a person spend time in a jail cell.57  
The Seventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s ruling and 
held that Morgan’s criminal history was calculated correctly.58 The 
Seventh Circuit noted that, regardless of the words used to describe 
Morgan’s first offense, Morgan was still caught on two separate 
occasions driving with a revoked license.59 The prosecutor did not draft 
his charges to multiply Morgan’s convictions.60 Instead, Morgan 
committed the first offense and then failed to obey the law by committing 
the offense again.61 The Seventh Circuit opined that a defendant who is 
arrested for one crime and then commits another offense is a recidivist 
and should therefore receive an increased criminal history score.62  
The court also noted that including traffic citations in the definition of 
intervening arrest furthers the goals of the Commission.63 Additionally, 
the court held that “[a] traffic stop is an ‘arrest’ in federal parlance.”64 
The court determined that, although the officer did not handcuff the 
defendant, the officer did stop Morgan and prevent him from leaving 
while the officer issued the citation.65 According to the court, the officer 
could have performed a full custodial arrest by taking Morgan to the 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 623. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. (referring to Application Note 3 to section 4A1.2 of the 2003 Guidelines). At the 
time of United States v. Morgan, Application Note 3 to section 4A1.2 provided as follows:  
Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were 
separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first 
offense prior to committing the second offense). Otherwise, prior sentences are 
considered related if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same 
occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were 
consolidated for trial or sentencing. 
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 application note 3 (2003)). In 2007, 
Note 3 was struck from the Application Notes and the term intervening arrest was moved to 
§ 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines when the provision was amended. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 (2007); see supra note 53. 
 58. Morgan, 354 F.3d  at 624.  
 59. Id. at 623.  
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 624 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States v. 
Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).  
 65. See id. at 623–24.  
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station,66 but the fact that the officer instead chose to perform a street 
arrest is irrelevant to the Guidelines’ purposes.67 The court reasoned that 
Application Note 3 uses the term intervening arrest instead of extended 
custody because “it is the apprehension followed by a new offense that 
identifies the recidivist.”68 
B.  The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Leal-Felix 
Israel Leal-Felix was a Mexican citizen who was deported from the 
United States “after pleading guilty to the aggravated felony of 
possessing  a firearm by a convicted felon.”69 Following his deportation, 
Leal-Felix was charged with illegally reentering the country without 
consent to reapply for admission, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 
§ 1326(b)(2).70 He accepted a binding plea agreement, agreeing to plead 
guilty in exchange for a government recommendation that the judge 
sentence him at the lower end of the guideline range at a total offense 
level of nine.71 Although Leal-Felix waived his right to appeal the 
sentence, “he reserved the right to appeal the calculation of his criminal 
history category.”72  
Included in Leal-Felix’s criminal history were two traffic citations 
that he received two days apart for driving with a suspended license.73 On 
January 19, 2000, Leal-Felix was sentenced for both citations, and he 
received “concurrent sentences of 36 months’ probation on the condition 
that he served 180 days in county jail.”74 According to the presentence 
investigation report (PSIR) in 2009, Leal-Felix had fourteen criminal 
history points and should have been placed in criminal history category 
VI.75 The judge determined his criminal history by counting the two 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 624 (“Morgan could have been taken to the stationhouse, converting a street arrest 
to a full custodial arrest”) (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353–55 (2001)).  
 67. Id. at 624.  
 68. Id.  
 69. United States v. Leal-Felix, 625 F.3d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 70. United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
 71. Id. An alien who illegally reenters the United States after deportation subsequent to a 
conviction for commission of an aggravated felony shall receive an increased sentence. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). Under the Guidelines, illegal reentry into the United States has a base 
offense level of eight. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(a) (2014). The offense 
level could be increased up to another sixteen levels if the defendant was previously deported 
after a conviction for a firearm offense. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Leal-Felix’s binding plea agreement 
lowered his offense level to nine. His recommended guideline range would therefore depend on a 
calculation of his criminal history score.  
 72. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1039. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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citations separately.76 Therefore, Leal-Felix received two points for each 
citation for driving with a suspended license.77  
At the sentencing hearing, “Leal-Felix objected to counting the second 
citation separately under Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.2(a)(2), because 
the two violations were sentenced on the same day and were not separated 
by an intervening arrest.”78 Additionally, Leal-Felix contended that, 
because he was only given a citation for the first violation, the second 
violation should not be included at all in his criminal history score.79 The 
district court rejected his argument and held that traffic citations are 
arrests under section 4A1.2(a)(2), and therefore, the first ticket for driving 
with a suspended license was an intervening arrest.80 Applying this 
reasoning, the court calculated that Leal-Felix only had thirteen criminal 
history points but was still in criminal history category VI.81 In August of 
2009, adhering to the plea agreement, the judge sentenced Leal-Felix at 
the low end of the guideline range for category VI.82 He was sentenced 
to twenty-one months in prison.83  
Leal-Felix appealed this sentence.84 A divided panel of the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s calculation of Leal-Felix’s criminal 
history score.85 In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied on the 
holding in United States v. Morgan.86 Their decision declared, “We agree 
with the Seventh Circuit in Morgan that treatment of Leal-Felix’s traffic 
violations as arrests comports with the Sentencing Guidelines.”87 Leal-
Felix petitioned for a rehearing, which the court granted.88  
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit vacated Leal-Felix’s sentence and 
remanded the case for resentencing.89 The court, sitting en banc, held that 
the issuance of a traffic citation did not constitute an intervening arrest 
for purposes of the Guidelines.90 The court noted that the holding of the 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. According to the Sentencing Table, a defendant assigned to criminal history category 
VI who committed a crime with an offense level of nine is subject to a guideline range of twenty-
one to twenty-seven months. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 83. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1039. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; see also United States v. Leal-Felix, 625 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 87. Leal-Felix, 625 F.3d at 1151 (agreeing with the reasoning in United States v. Morgan, 
354 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
 88. United States v. Leal-Felix, 641 F.3d 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 89. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1044. 
 90. Id.  
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case hinged on the definition of an intervening arrest.91 If the court found 
that a citation was equivalent to an intervening arrest, then the sentencing 
judge would count Leal-Felix’s two citations separately.92 This procedure 
would add two points for each citation and therefore leave him in criminal 
history category VI.93 The guideline range for category VI is twenty-one 
to twenty-seven months.94 If, however, the court found that a citation is 
not an intervening arrest, then the sentencing judge would combine Leal-
Felix’s two citations.95 In this case, the correct designation would be 
criminal history category V with a guideline range of eighteen to twenty-
four months.96 The court noted that the Guidelines do not define 
intervening arrest; therefore, the court had to interpret the term’s meaning 
to resolve the appeal.97  
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by “applying normal rules of 
statutory interpretation.”98 The court noted that it was improper to look 
to state law to define the term intervening arrest and concluded that the 
term would be interpreted “according to a uniform, national definition, 
not dependent upon the vagaries of state law.”99 The court held that, under 
the Guidelines, an arrest is a “formal arrest.”100 “A formal arrest may be 
indicated by informing the suspect that he is under arrest, transporting the 
suspect to the police station, and/or booking the suspect into jail.”101 The 
court emphasized that such a definition was consistent with the common 
usage of the term, consistent with case law, and in line with the purposes 
of the Guidelines.102 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
Morgan—the only other circuit court opinion interpreting the term 
intervening arrest in the context of section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the 
Guidelines.103 The Ninth Circuit declined to follow Morgan, concluding 
that the Seventh Circuit did not rely on appropriate authority.104 The court 
concluded that Morgan’s reliance on Whren v. United States105 and 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 1040.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1041.  
 101. Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
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Atwater v. City of Lago Vista106 was improper because neither case dealt 
with the issue of whether traffic citations constitute intervening arrests.107 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined that Supreme Court case law 
supported the distinction between an arrest and a citation.108 
The Leal-Felix court cited Berkemer v. McCarty,109 in which a police 
officer pulled over the defendant, questioned him, and asked him to 
perform a field sobriety test.110 The police officer then placed the 
defendant under arrest and drove him to jail for further questioning.111 In 
Berkemer, “the Court clarified that custody is the distinguishing 
characteristic of an arrest.”112 Therefore, the Court determined that any 
statements made by the defendant prior to his arrest were not subject to 
exclusion for violating his Miranda rights because the defendant was not 
in custody.113 The Court in Berkemer repeatedly analogized the concepts 
of being under arrest and being in custody.114 The Ninth Circuit also cited 
Knowles v. Iowa,115 in which the Supreme Court distinguished between a 
traffic stop and an arrest.116 In Knowles, the Court noted that the police 
officer chose to issue the defendant a citation rather than arrest the 
defendant.117 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the Guidelines as a whole suggest 
that traffic citations are not intervening arrests.118 The court reasoned that 
the purpose of the criminal history score is to approximate “the 
seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history and the danger that the 
defendant presents to the public.”119 A defendant who receives a traffic 
                                                                                                                     
 106. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
 107. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1042. The Court in Whren held that a traffic stop constitutes a 
seizure and therefore an officer must have probable cause to render the stop reasonable. 517 U.S. 
at 809–10. In Atwater, the Court did not address the question of whether the defendant was 
“arrested.” 532 U.S. at 324. The defendant was clearly arrested because she was handcuffed, taken 
to the police station, and placed in a jail cell. Id. Therefore, the Atwater Court had no reason to 
take up this question.  
 108. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1043. 
 109. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
 110. Id. at 423; see Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1043 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420).  
 111.  Berkemer, 468 U.S.at 423.  
 112. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1043 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420); see also Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 434, 441–42. 
 113. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442.  
 114. Id. 429–32, 434, 440–42. 
 115. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).  
 116. Id. at 117; see Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1043 (citing Knowles, 525 U.S. 113). 
 117. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 114 (“An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for 
speeding, but issued him a citation rather than arresting him”). 
 118. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1043. 
 119. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 application note 3 (2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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citation and is not taken into custody presents little danger to society and 
has committed a less serious crime than a defendant who is taken into 
custody.120 Furthermore, the court noted that “[t]he Sentencing 
Guidelines generally exclude from the criminal history calculation 
sentences imposed for driving with a suspended license, further 
indicating the Commission’s judgment that such offenses are relatively 
minor.”121 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that interpreting the term intervening 
arrest to include traffic citations would mean that being arrested is 
equivalent to being charged with an offense.122 Substituting the word 
“charge” for the word “arrest” would lead to every offense being an 
intervening arrest and would render the last two sentences of section 
4A1.2(a)(2) obsolete.123 Additionally, the court noted that in cases in 
which the criminal history score underrepresents the danger of the 
defendant or the seriousness of the crime, the district court can use its 
discretion to apply an upward departure from the guideline range instead 
of considering all citations as arrests.124 Finally, the court reasoned that 
the term intervening arrest lacks a clear definition and thus, under the rule 
of lenity, the court must interpret the term in Leal-Felix’s favor.125 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that traffic citations should not 
constitute intervening arrests.126 
Judge Mary McKeown concurred in the opinion but “wr[o]te 
separately to highlight the most compelling reason for concluding that a 
traffic citation is not an arrest for the purposes of the Sentencing 
Guidelines: the common understanding of the term arrest does not include 
being pulled over and ticketed for a traffic violation.”127 Judge McKeown 
noted that a well-known principle of statutory construction is that words, 
unless otherwise defined, will be interpreted using their common 
meaning.128 She reasoned that the average driver does not perceive their 
detention during a traffic stop, when the officer is running their driver’s 
license and issuing the ticket, as being in custody or under arrest.129  
Judge Johnnie Rawlinson dissented in Leal-Felix and argued that “the 
majority . . . improperly import[ed] Fourth Amendment analysis into 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c)(1)).  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1044.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (McKeown, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. at 1044–45 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).  
 129. Id. at 1046.  
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calculation of a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines.” 130 She noted 
that the purpose of the case was to define the term “arrest” in order to 
assess Leal-Felix’s recidivism and calculate his criminal history score, 
not to determine whether there was a constitutional violation.131 Yet she 
noted that all of the case law in the majority’s opinion pertained to the 
term arrest in the context of constitutional violations.132 Judge Rawlinson 
concluded that there is no Supreme Court case law to support the 
majority’s position and that the Supreme Court has “specifically 
cautioned against the approach taken by the majority.”133 She concluded 
that the Seventh Circuit’s broad definition of intervening arrest is more 
in line with the principles of sentencing.134 She argued that “[t]reating a 
traffic citation as a non-event seriously undermines the recidivism 
consideration of the guidelines and understates the criminal history of 
repeat offenders.”135 
C.  The Middle District of Florida: United States v. Johnson 
With its ruling in Johnson, the Middle District of Florida is the most 
recent court to weigh in on the current split—but the court’s holding 
focuses mainly on citations for drug offenses, not traffic citations, as 
intervening arrests. Defendant Franklin Johnson was charged with four 
counts of distributing cocaine or crack cocaine.136 Johnson was also 
charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.137 
Johnson entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty 
to one of the felon-in-possession counts.138 In exchange for his guilty 
plea, all of the remaining counts were dismissed.139 According to the plea 
agreement, Johnson could not challenge his sentence on the grounds that 
the district court incorrectly calculated his guideline range.140 The 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 1048. 
 136. United States v. Johnson, 515 F. App’x 844, 846 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “[I]t 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally [to] . . . distribute . . . a controlled 
substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).  
 137. Johnson, 515 F. App’x at 846. “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
convicted in any court [of a] crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
(2012).  
 138. Johnson, 515 F. App’x at 846.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 848.  
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agreement, however, did provide three exceptions.141 Johnson could 
challenge the sentence if: (1) it exceeded the guideline range determined 
by the district court, (2) it exceeded the statutory maximum, or (3) if it 
violated the Eighth Amendment.142  
According to Johnson’s PSIR, under Guidelines section 2K2.1(a)(1), 
Johnson was assigned a base offense level of twenty-six.143 Under 
Guidelines section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) he was subject to a four-level increase 
“for possessing a firearm in connection with a felony drug trafficking 
offense and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, 
yielding an adjusted offense level of 27.”144 The PSIR also indicated that 
Johnson had fifteen criminal history points for his eighteen prior 
convictions.145 Thus, the PSIR placed Johnson in criminal history 
category VI.146  
Included in Johnson’s prior convictions were four prior sentences that 
were all imposed on the same day.147 On June 6, 1999, Johnson was 
arrested for driving with a suspended license.148 On October 19, 1999, 
Johnson was issued a citation for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance.149 Then, on October 25, 1999, he received a citation for 
driving with a suspended license.150 Finally, Johnson was taken into 
custody on December 19, 1999, for driving under the influence.151 On 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Section 2K2.1(a)(1) of the Guidelines provides: 
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest): 
(1) 26, if (A) the offense involved a (i) semiautomatic firearm that is capable of 
accepting a large capacity magazine; or (ii) firearm that is described in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5845(a); and (B) the defendant committed any part of the instant offense 
subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.  
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(1) (2014). 
 144. Johnson, 515 F. App’x at 846; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (providing that a four-level increase is appropriate if the defendant “used or 
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or 
transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would 
be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense”); id § 3E1.1 (explaining the 
offense level reduction for accepting responsibility and assisting authorities).  
 145. Johnson, 515 F. App’x at 846.  
 146. Id. 
 147. United States v. Johnson, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in part 
and dismissed in part, 515 F. App’x 844.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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June 26, 2000, Johnson was sentenced for all four offenses.152 He 
received one year of probation for his first offense of driving with a 
suspended license and was sentenced to sixty days in jail for the 
remaining three offenses.153  
Johnson objected to the individual inclusion of all four of his prior 
offenses in the calculation of his criminal history score.154 He argued that, 
because the second and third offenses resulted in citations rather than 
arrests, they should not be counted separately under section 4A1.2 of the 
Guidelines.155 As previously noted, under that section, if a defendant is 
sentenced for all of his offenses on the same day, the offenses are counted 
as a single prior offense unless there is an intervening arrest.156 In 
applying section 4A1.2, the district court addressed the issue of whether 
“the citations issued by law enforcement officers for the second and third 
offenses should be counted as intervening arrests––and therefore separate 
offenses––in calculating Mr. Johnson’s criminal history category.”157  
The district court addressed the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Morgan 
and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Leal-Felix.158 In discussing the circuit 
split, the court noted that Morgan and Leal-Felix “dealt only with whether 
citations for driving license violations should be included in the criminal 
history score.”159 In contrast, Johnson not only involved a citation for 
driving with a suspended license but it also involved a citation for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance.160 Under Florida law, 
driving with a suspended license is at least a second-degree misdemeanor 
punishable by sixty days incarceration.161 Unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance is a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by a 
maximum sentence of one year in jail.162 The court noted that, unlike 
driving offenses, which are commonly charged with a citation, drug-
related offenses are rarely charged with citations.163 “In fact this case is 
the first time the Court has been made aware of this practice—one that 
apparently is within the discretion of Daytona Beach police officers.”164  
The district court, following the Seventh Circuit in Morgan and Judge 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1273. 
 156. Supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.  
 157. Johnson, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 1275. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
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Rawlinson’s dissent in Leal-Felix, held that the citations were arrests for 
purposes of calculating a criminal history score.165 The court reasoned 
that “not scoring offenses initiated by citation is an affront to the 
credibility of the Guidelines to the extent they were enacted to encourage 
imposition of similar sentences for similarly situated defendants.”166 The 
court held that it was illogical that a defendant convicted in Daytona 
Beach would have a lower criminal history score because the officer 
chose to issue a citation, while a defendant convicted of the same offense 
in Cocoa Beach would have more points included in his criminal history 
score because the officer chose to arrest him.167 If citations are not 
included in a defendant’s criminal history score, then determining 
whether an offense will result in points “might turn not just on the policies 
of various municipal police departments but also perhaps on the whim of 
the officer who apprehends the defendant.”168 The court noted that the 
policy behind section 4A1.2 was to ensure uniformity of sentences for 
similar offenses committed by similar defendants.169 Therefore, in the 
court’s eyes, ignoring citations in calculating an offender’s criminal 
history score failed to serve that policy.170  
Johnson appealed the district court’s ruling and contended that the 
court miscalculated his criminal history score by counting several of his 
prior convictions as separate offenses.171 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Johnson’s claim because the appeal of his 
criminal history score did not fall within any of the exceptions of the 
appeal waiver; therefore, he was barred from bringing the argument.172  
III.  ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DEFINITION  
The ruling in Johnson does not actually weigh in on the current circuit 
split because Johnson is clearly distinguishable from both Morgan and 
Leal-Felix. The split between the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits pertains 
to whether traffic citations should be considered intervening arrests in 
calculating a defendant’s criminal history score.173 Although the court’s 
ruling in Johnson involved a traffic citation, its analysis focused on 
whether a citation for a controlled substance offense should be considered 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. United States v. Johnson, 515 F. App’x 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  
 172. Id. at 849; see supra note 140–42 and accompanying text.  
 173. See United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United 
States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2003).  
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an intervening arrest in calculating the defendant’s criminal history 
score.174 The court in Johnson explicitly made the distinction between its 
facts and the facts in Morgan and Leal-Felix.175 The court concluded that 
a citation for a controlled substance offense is an intervening arrest, yet 
it did not thoroughly address the citation for driving with a suspended 
license.  
While the Johnson court did make general statements about why 
citations should be considered arrests for purposes of calculating a 
defendant’s criminal history score, it did not specifically address any 
arguments about why traffic citations in particular should be considered 
intervening arrests. However, the court did explain why the citation for a 
controlled substance offense was an intervening arrest. The court’s failure 
to address arguments pertaining to whether traffic citations should be 
considered intervening arrests adds little strength to the Seventh Circuit’s 
position. Instead, the court’s holding is a more general argument about 
why every offense involving a citation should be included in a 
defendant’s criminal history. Because the current circuit split is based 
solely on whether traffic citations should be considered intervening 
arrests, the court in Johnson does little to resolve this argument.  
Aside from the lack of authority in favor of the Seventh Circuit’s 
argument, the Ninth Circuit’s definition of an intervening arrest should 
prevail because “the majority’s reasoning exemplifies the common law 
methodological approach that best furthers the purpose of the 
Guidelines.”176 This common law approach allows the court to consider 
important policy factors177 and provides a “broader body of judicial 
precedents as the ‘comprehensive body’ that judges should reference in 
reading undefined terms.”178 Under this approach, judges have more 
flexibility to consider other factors such as “relevant case law, canons of 
construction, and policy considerations” when interpreting undefined 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Johnson, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.  
 175. Id. (“The facts of this case differ slightly from those in Morgan and Leal-Felix, both of 
which dealt only with whether citations for driving license violations should be included in the 
criminal history score.”).  
 176. Recent Cases, Criminal Law—Sentencing Guidelines—Ninth Circuit Holds That Traffic 
Citation Is Not an “Intervening Arrest” Under Section 4A1.2(A)(2) of the Guidelines—United 
States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 125 HARV. L. REV. 2157, 2157 
(2012) [hereinafter Harvard Recent Case].  
 177. Id. at 2157, 2161.  
 178. Id. at 2162 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1215, 1218 (2001)). This is in contrast with civil code approach where judges need only look 
to the text the Guidelines drafters prepared and reason by analogy to other provisions to find the 
correct definition of an intervening arrest. Id.; see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 1218. 
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terms in the Guidelines.179 Additionally, explicit statements in the 
Guidelines make clear the appropriateness of applying a common law 
approach.180 According to the legislative history of the Guidelines, the 
Commission did not expect judges to apply the Guidelines 
mechanically.181 Instead, a judge must consider all relevant factors before 
imposing a sentence.182 “The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to 
provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the 
sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful 
imposition of individualized sentences.”183  
Under a common law approach, the Ninth Circuit recognized the 
Guidelines’ failure to define the term intervening arrest and sought to 
interpret the meaning within a broader context.184 The court addressed 
the ambiguity of the term through a combination of common law sources 
including case law, statutory interpretation, common understanding, an 
analysis of the purposes behind the Guidelines, and an application of the 
rule of lenity.185 Based on this analysis, the court held that there was no 
justification for defining intervening arrest to include traffic citations.186 
“The majority’s approach outlines a proper method that fully embraces 
judges’ discretion in sentencing and ultimately leads to an appropriate, 
proportional sentence reflecting the real threat of the individual 
defendant.”187 The Ninth Circuit’s application of the common law 
approach involved an analysis of many factors relevant to sentencing and 
defined the term intervening arrest in a way that best reflected the 
purposes of the Guidelines.  
In addition to the factors the Ninth Circuit considered, the common 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2162; see also Mark R. Conrad, Interpreting 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law: A Case for Cases, 23 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (“[W]hereas 
the civil law tradition typically vests authority to interpret the law with the legislature, the common 
law tradition places that power—sometimes ‘emphatically’—in the judiciary.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); Frank B. Cross, Identifying 
the Virtues of the Common Law, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 21, 45 (2007) (“Yet it is the common 
law tradition that is considered ‘judge centered,’ providing greater discretionary power to the 
judiciary.”); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 178, at 1218 (“Gaps in the common law are filled 
by a process of reasoning by analogy, figuring out how a new problem is akin to, and different 
from, prior judicial determinations.”). 
 180. See Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2162; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 
(1983).  
 181. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52.  
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1040–44 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2163.  
 185. See Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1041–44; Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2163. 
 186. Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2163.  
 187. See id. 
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law approach also allows courts to take into account other relevant policy 
considerations that the court in Leal-Felix did not address. First, 
interpreting the term intervening arrest to include traffic citations “would 
result in criminals with unlike culpability or violence in their criminal 
histories being punished with equal severity.”188 Yet, proportionality in 
sentencing is among the Guidelines’ objectives. Congress sought to 
create a system that would impose different sentences for crimes of 
differing severity.189 Yet, allowing traffic citations to count as intervening 
arrests when computing a defendant’s criminal history score could result 
in scores that do not accurately reflect an individual’s culpability.190 
Under the Seventh Circuit’s reading of the Guidelines, Leal-Felix “could 
have received the same number of criminal history points for his two 
traffic citations as another defendant who committed an aggravated 
assault and robbery that resulted in a single sentence of several years.”191 
Such an outcome would be at odds with the Guidelines’ objectives 
because two defendants with clearly unequal levels of culpability would 
receive the same sentence.192  
Additionally, including traffic citations in the definition of intervening 
arrests could preclude defendants from safety-valve relief.193 Applying 
the reasoning in Morgan could result in pushing offenders into the next 
criminal history category, therefore disqualifying the offender from the 
safety valve of a mandatory minimum.194 Congress created the safety-
valve provision of the Guidelines to allow judges to sentence first-time 
drug offenders to sentences under the Guidelines rather than imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences.195 Only those defendants who are less 
culpable—those who do not have more than one criminal history point—
qualify for sentences below the statutory minimum.196 Thus, interpreting 
intervening arrests to include criminal traffic citations could inflate a 
defendant’s criminal history score and therefore preclude the individual 
from the safety-valve provision.  
                                                                                                                     
 188. See id. at 2164.  
 189. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2014) (setting forth the “basic 
approach” to the Sentencing Guidelines and the “their underlying rationale”).  
 190. See Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1042 (“[O]ne who is subjected only to a momentary 
detention and later reoffends is less culpable than the defendant who is subjected to the greater 
deterrence of an arrest . . . .”).  
 191. See Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2164–65.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 2164.  
 194. Id.  
 195. See id. at 2164 n.69; 28A C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 493 (2008); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2014).  
 196. See 28A C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 493; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5C1.2. 
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For example, under the holding in Morgan, if a defendant was pulled 
over on two separate occasions, issued two traffic citations, and sentenced 
concurrently for both offenses, then the individual would have two 
criminal history points.197 Thus, the individual would be precluded from 
safety-valve eligibility.198 In contrast, under the holding in Leal-Felix, the 
same defendant would only have one criminal history point and thus still 
be eligible for safety-valve relief.199 Should the fact that someone 
received two traffic citations prevent them from safety-valve eligibility? 
Do two paper citations really make their recipient more culpable, or is 
someone who has only received citations exactly the type of defendant 
the safety-valve provision was intended to protect? 
Finally, interpreting intervening arrests to include traffic citations 
could result in inflated criminal history scores for minorities due to racial 
profiling.200 A widely acknowledged phenomenon known as “Driving 
While Black/Brown” describes “the race-based suspicion of black and 
Latino motorists and the resulting pretextual traffic stops.”201 This racial 
profiling can cause inflated numbers of traffic citations and therefore lead 
to inflated criminal history scores for minority drivers, resulting in higher 
sentences for these groups.202 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Leal-Felix 
would help avoid the issue of racial disparity in calculating criminal 
history scores because drivers’ criminal history scores would not be 
increased due to the issuance of criminal traffic citations. For these 
reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s definition of an intervening arrest should 
prevail over the Seventh Circuit’s. The holding in Leal-Felix better 
reflects the purposes of the Guidelines and allows greater flexibility for 
judges to take into account important policy considerations.  
                                                                                                                     
 197. See Steve Kalar, Case O’ The Week: Ninth, En Banc, Gets Its “Citations” Right—Leal-
Felix and Sentencing Guidelines, NINTH CIRCUIT BLOG (Dec. 3, 2011, 9:01 AM), 
http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2011/12/case-o-week-ninth-en-banc-gets-its.html. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id.  
 200. See Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2165–66. 
 201. See Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2165; David A. Harris, The Stories, the 
Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1999); 
Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial Profiling in 
Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2005); Katheryn K. Russell, 
“Driving While Black”: Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
717 (1999).  
 202. See Harvard Recent Case, supra note 176, at 2165–66; Harris, supra note 201, at 304–
05 (“Driving while black can have grave consequences not just immediately, when drivers may 
be at best irritated and at worst arrested or abused, but in the long term, as a minor criminal record 
builds over time to the point that it comes back to haunt a defendant by enhancing considerably 
the sentence in some future proceeding. This is simply less likely to happen to whites.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
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IV.  PROPOSAL 
Among the responsibilities of the Commission is the duty to evaluate 
the effects of the Guidelines and to recommend appropriate Guidelines 
modifications to Congress.203 The current version of the Guidelines 
explains that an offense is an intervening arrest if the defendant is arrested 
for the offense and thereafter commits another offense.204 Yet, the 
Guidelines explanation of an intervening arrest does not address whether 
traffic citations constitute intervening arrests. This ambiguity has resulted 
in the current circuit split. A simple revision of section 4A1.2 of 
Guidelines to include a statement about traffic citations could resolve the 
split and ensure that an offender’s criminal history calculation reflects the 
purposes of the Guidelines. The Commission would need to craft a 
statement establishing that traffic citations do not constitute intervening 
arrests for purposes of calculating a defendant’s criminal history score. 
This statement could be added to the current explanation in the 
Guidelines to provide a clearer definition of what constitutes an 
intervening arrest.   
In agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s holding, this Note is not arguing 
that all citations should be excluded in calculating a defendant’s criminal 
history score. The split and the previous arguments pertain only to 
whether criminal traffic citations should be considered intervening arrests 
for purposes of calculating an individual’s criminal history score. Other 
citations, such as the drug-related citation in Johnson, are beyond the 
scope of this Note. Therefore, the revision to the Guidelines should 
specifically negate traffic citations as intervening arrests. The addition of 
a simple statement—“The issuance of a written traffic citation is not an 
intervening arrest”—would clear up any ambiguity for judges in 
calculating an offender’s score. Under this new definition, an offender’s 
criminal traffic citation would not be counted separately; therefore, the 
defendant would have a lower criminal history score and could ultimately 
be assigned to a lower criminal history category.  
While this proposal does remedy many of the issues discussed in Part 
III, it does not completely resolve the current split because the decisions 
of police officers can still impact a defendant’s criminal history score. 
Once a police officer pulls over a traffic offender, the officer has 
unfettered discretion to issue a citation or place the individual under 
arrest.205 Therefore, even incorporating this proposal into the Guidelines 
                                                                                                                     
 203. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 1. 
 204. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2.  
 205. Nancy Leong, The Open Road and the Traffic Stop: Narratives and Counter-Narratives 
of the American Dream, 64 FLA. L. REV. 305, 326 (2012) (noting that present standards “allow 
police officers to exercise an enormous amount of discretion in performing traffic stops”); Illya 
Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 425, 428 (2003).  
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does not resolve the issue of parity where defendants have committed the 
same crime, have the same culpability, and should have the same criminal 
history score, but one defendant is arrested and the other is only issued a 
citation. Is a defendant who is arrested for driving with a suspended 
license more culpable than an individual who is issued a citation for 
driving with a suspended license? Is it fair to increase one defendant’s 
criminal history score because the police officer chose to place the 
defendant in handcuffs rather than issue a traffic citation? Adding this 
Part’s proposal to the Guidelines would still leave these significant 
questions unanswered. 
The court in Johnson could have addressed these questions had the 
defendant made these arguments.  In Johnson, the defendant was arrested 
for driving with a suspended license and then months later issued a 
citation when he was caught driving with a suspended license again. 
However, the defendant in Johnson only argued against the calculation 
of his traffic citation for driving with a suspended license and not against 
his arrest for driving with a suspended license. Most likely the defendant 
did not make this argument because little question exists as to whether an 
individual who is placed in handcuffs and taken to the police station has 
been arrested. Yet, because police have such discretion, even 
incorporating a clearer definition for an intervening arrest could result in 
assigning two defendants with the exact same criminal history different 
scores. One of the primary purposes of the Guidelines is to ensure that 
criminals of similar culpability receive similar sentences,206 but even this 
Note’s proposed solution could fail to achieve that purpose.  
While police discretion prevents this proposal from being a perfect 
solution, it is important to remember the importance of officer discretion 
and to keep in mind that such discretion allows the police to consider 
important factors such as criminal history scores when choosing whether 
to issue a traffic citation or place someone under arrest. Police discretion 
is essential to law enforcement operations.207 This discretion allows 
officers to “meet individual situations with judgment and intelligence, 
and to choose their responses so that the ultimate result will make 
sense.”208 While police officers do have the discretion to issue a traffic 
citation or perform a formal arrest, police officers exercise that discretion 
wisely.209 Ultimately, officers are accountable for each of the citations 
they issue, they have a responsibility to appear in court to defend their 
                                                                                                                     
 206. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 9, at 1. 
 207. Arthur G. Sharp, Discretion Is Valor in Traffic Stops, HENDON MEDIA GRP., 
http://www.hendonpub.com/resources/article_archive/results/details?id=4004 (last visited Apr. 
1, 2015).  
 208. Harris, supra note 201, at 302.  
 209. Sharp, supra note 207.  
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decisions, and the issuance of a citation can affect both the officer’s and 
their department’s reputations.210 For these reasons, officers take their 
discretion very seriously. Officers are aware of the repercussions that an 
arrest has on an individual’s criminal history, and they can take that into 
account when choosing whether to issue a traffic citation or put the 
offender in handcuffs.211 
Many critics contend that officers abuse their discretion in ways that 
further sentencing disparity. Critics of police discretion argue that 
“[t]here are varying factors that may influence police decision making 
that have nothing to do with the motorist[’s] . . . conduct.”212 Police 
officers are often influenced by quotas or by the demeanor, age, race, or 
political affiliation of the offender.213 Such discretion allows officers to 
pick and choose whom to pull over, whom to issue citations, and whom 
to place under arrest. These are decisions officers often make for reasons 
not related to culpability or uniformity in sentencing. Some critics argue 
that police discretion leads to disparate treatment,214 which can extend to 
sentencing. Police officers may abuse their discretion by considering 
irrelevant factors when choosing to issue a citation or place the offender 
under formal arrest, and police officers could use their discretion to 
negatively affect a defendant’s criminal history score and, in turn, the 
defendant’s guideline range. According to these critics, including a 
definition for intervening arrest in the Guidelines could still result in 
criminal history scores that do not reflect a defendant’s culpability. 
Although the critics of police discretion do raise valid concerns, their 
arguments fail to consider the importance of police discretion in law 
enforcement and fail to consider the positive effects police discretion can 
have on sentencing. There is no doubt that varying factors can influence 
officers when they choose whether to issue a traffic citation or place the 
offender under formal arrest. And while critics of police discretion 
contend that inappropriate factors can influence officers, factors such as 
criminal sentencing or the defendant’s culpability can also influence the 
officers. Police discretion allows officers to consider the calculation of a 
motorist’s criminal history score before deciding whether to arrest the 
individual. As long as police officers consider sentencing repercussions 
                                                                                                                     
 210. Id.  
 211. See, e.g., Civil Citations a Way to Keep Juveniles out of System, DAYTONA BEACH 
NEWS-J. (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.news-journalonline.com/article/20130810/opinion/ 
130809460 (discussing state encouragement of civil citations rather than arrests for juveniles who 
commit misdemeanors to keep them out of the system and to avoid affecting their criminal 
history).  
 212. Lichtenberg, supra note 205, at 442.  
 213. Id. at 439–42. 
 214. SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
28 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd 
_reducingracialdisparity.pdf.  
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when making decisions, this Note’s proposal is still a viable solution to 
address the current circuit split. A bright-line rule is necessary to resolve 
the current split and ensure uniformity in future sentencing, and this 
Note’s proposal adequately resolves the issues discussed earlier in Part 
III. Although police discretion leaves room for some inconsistencies in 
sentencing, this discretion is vital to law enforcement, and, therefore, 
police must be able to decide whether to issue a traffic citation or perform 
an arrest—a decision that should be made with criminal history scores in 
mind.  
CONCLUSION 
While this Note’s proposal may not completely solve the problem of 
sentencing disparity, because of officer discretion, it at least addresses the 
unresolved split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The Seventh 
Circuit’s definition of an intervening arrest leaves little room for courts 
to consider important factors and policy arguments relevant to 
sentencing, and this could result in inflated criminal history scores for 
minorities due to racial profiling. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding in Morgan does not reflect one of the primary objectives of the 
Guidelines—uniformity in sentencing. The Seventh Circuit’s definition 
could result in defendants with dissimilar culpability being punished with 
equal severity. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s common law approach 
addresses all of these issues and provides courts with broader authority 
to define the term intervening arrest in a way that best reflects the 
purposes of the Guidelines. Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit’s 
definition is not a perfect solution, it is certainly preferable to the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation.  
In conclusion, amending the Guidelines to add the statement—“The 
issuance of a written traffic citation is not an intervening arrest”—would 
resolve the current split and address a number of policy considerations 
that the Seventh Circuit failed to take into account. This revision would 
result in more uniform sentences among offenders with similar 
culpability, one of the primary goals of the Guidelines. In addition to 
aligning with the intent of the Guidelines, this Note’s proposal resolves 
the sentencing disparity issues that result from police officers racially 
profiling motorists. The proposal also eliminates the problem of 
precluding defendants from safety-valve relief, defendants who the 
safety-valve provision was intended to protect. Ultimately, this revision 
helps create a fairer sentencing system that calculates a defendant’s 
sentence based on the severity of her conduct. While including the 
proposal still leaves some questions unanswered because of the necessity 
of police discretion, this discretion is a much-needed part of law 
enforcement, and allows officers to consider factors relevant to 
sentencing when making decisions. Therefore, this Note’s proposed 
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solution coupled with appropriate police discretion, which takes into 
account the effects of officers’ decisions on a defendant’s criminal history 
score, resolves the current split and remedies many of the issues raised in 
Part III. 
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 11
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/11




                                                                                                                     
 215. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2014). 
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